What Happens When AI Meets SCADA?

Most SCADA systems run on fixed schedules, reactive alarms, and the idea that “normal” is good enough.

But downtime is expensive, and false positives are worse.

That’s where AI begins to whisper, not shout.

Detects anomalies before the pressure drops
Reduces alarm floods with context-aware logic
Surfaces patterns that predict tomorrow, not just repeat yesterday

Want to see what real foresight looks like?
Email us at info@scadatend.com

T𝗵𝗲 𝗬𝗶𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗬𝗮𝗻𝗎 𝗌𝗳 𝗊𝗖𝗔𝗗𝗔 𝗣𝗿𝗌𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝘀

𝘞𝘩𝘊𝘳𝘊 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘊𝘚𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘰𝘳𝘎 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘀𝘭𝘪𝘊𝘯𝘵𝘎 𝘀𝘭𝘢𝘎𝘩 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘞𝘩𝘺 𝘰𝘷𝘊𝘳𝘎𝘪𝘚𝘩𝘵 𝘪𝘎 𝘵𝘩𝘊 𝘮𝘪𝘎𝘎𝘪𝘯𝘚 𝘮𝘪𝘥𝘥𝘭𝘊.

SCADA projects should be clean.
They should follow logic.
They should run on discipline.

But anyone who’s been inside one knows the truth:
They often run on 𝗳𝗿𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗌𝗻, 𝗮𝘀𝘀𝘂𝗺𝗜𝘁𝗶𝗌𝗻𝘀, and 𝗰𝗌𝗻𝗳𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘁.

At the center of it all is a quiet tension no one talks about:

• The 𝗬𝗶𝗻....clients pushing for more, faster, cheaper
• The Y𝗮𝗻𝗎....integrators trying to deliver in chaos

And in between?
No translator. No referee. No one to steady the ship. And the delays and prices can keep going up.
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𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗹𝗶𝗲𝗻𝘁 (𝗧𝗵𝗲 “𝗬𝗶𝗻”)

Wants it done yesterday.
Wants results without the learning curve.
Wants a system that works
.𝘣𝘶𝘵 𝘥𝘰𝘊𝘎𝘯’𝘵 𝘞𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘵𝘰 𝘩𝘊𝘢𝘳 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘵 𝘱𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘚 𝘳𝘢𝘵𝘊𝘎, 𝘊𝘹𝘀𝘊𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘳𝘊𝘱𝘰𝘳𝘵𝘎, 𝘵𝘢𝘚 𝘮𝘢𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘚, 𝘰𝘳 𝘀𝘩𝘢𝘯𝘚𝘊 𝘰𝘳𝘥𝘊𝘳𝘎.

“Just make it work,” they say.
Then they wonder why it doesn’t perfectly fit their operations six months later.
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𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗎𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗌𝗿 (𝗧𝗵𝗲 “𝗬𝗮𝗻𝗎”)
Buried in vague specs.
Racing deadlines with shifting targets.
Trying to deliver functionality that no one has fully defined.

“This isn’t what we asked for,” the client says.
But no one wrote down what they 𝘢𝘀𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘯𝘊𝘊𝘥𝘊𝘥.

The integrator gets blamed. The client gets frustrated.
The control room inherits a fragile system.
And the cycle starts again on the next project.
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𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝗠𝗶𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗎? 𝗢𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗶𝗎𝗵𝘁.

Not a middleman.
Not more meetings.
Not another layer of approval.

What’s missing is someone who speaks both languages:
• The engineer’s language
• The operator’s language
• The executive’s language
• The integrator’s language

SCADATend was built to fill that space.
We don’t program systems.
We 𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝗵𝗲𝗹𝗜 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘂𝗜-𝗳𝗿𝗌𝗻𝘁 𝗜𝗮𝗜𝗲𝗿𝘄𝗌𝗿𝗞, 𝘄𝗮𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗌𝗳𝗳𝘀, 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝗞 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗰𝗌𝗜𝗲, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗺𝗶𝘀𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗎𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀 before disasters occur.

We sit between the yin and the yang
.and we make sure both sides walk away with something that actually works.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗊𝗖𝗔𝗗𝗔 𝗊𝗞𝗶𝗹𝗹𝘀 𝗚𝗮𝗜 𝗜𝘀 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹—𝗔𝗻𝗱 𝗚𝗲𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗎 𝗪𝗌𝗿𝘀𝗲.
𝘚𝘊𝘵𝘩 𝘙𝘢𝘯𝘚, 𝘗𝘌, 𝘎𝘶𝘮𝘮𝘊𝘥 𝘪𝘵 𝘶𝘱 𝘱𝘊𝘳𝘧𝘊𝘀𝘵𝘭𝘺:

"𝘚𝘶𝘱𝘊𝘳𝘷𝘪𝘎𝘰𝘳𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘰𝘭 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘢𝘵𝘢 𝘈𝘀𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘎𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 (𝘚𝘊𝘈𝘋𝘈) 𝘎𝘺𝘎𝘵𝘊𝘮𝘎 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘎𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘪𝘎 𝘚𝘳𝘰𝘞𝘪𝘯𝘚. 𝘏𝘰𝘞𝘊𝘷𝘊𝘳, 𝘢𝘯 𝘢𝘭𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘚 𝘵𝘳𝘊𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘎 𝘊𝘮𝘊𝘳𝘚𝘪𝘯𝘚 𝘞𝘩𝘊𝘳𝘊 𝘵𝘩𝘊 𝘯𝘶𝘮𝘣𝘊𝘳 𝘰𝘧 𝘲𝘶𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘊𝘥 𝘱𝘊𝘳𝘎𝘰𝘯𝘯𝘊𝘭 𝘧𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘳 𝘞𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘊𝘎𝘊 𝘀𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘀𝘢𝘭 𝘎𝘺𝘎𝘵𝘊𝘮𝘎 𝘪𝘎 𝘎𝘵𝘊𝘢𝘥𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘥𝘊𝘀𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘯𝘚. 𝘛𝘩𝘪𝘎 𝘎𝘬𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘎 𝘚𝘢𝘱 𝘱𝘳𝘊𝘎𝘊𝘯𝘵𝘎 𝘎𝘪𝘚𝘯𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘀𝘢𝘯𝘵 𝘀𝘩𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘊𝘯𝘚𝘊𝘎 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘶𝘎𝘵𝘳𝘪𝘊𝘎 𝘳𝘊𝘭𝘺𝘪𝘯𝘚 𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘊𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘀𝘪𝘊𝘯𝘀𝘺, 𝘳𝘊𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘺, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘰𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘎𝘺𝘎𝘵𝘊𝘮𝘎 𝘢𝘳𝘊 𝘚𝘊𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘚 𝘮𝘰𝘳𝘊 𝘀𝘰𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘊𝘹, 𝘞𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘊 𝘵𝘩𝘊 𝘱𝘊𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘊 𝘞𝘩𝘰 𝘵𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘺 𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘊𝘳𝘎𝘵𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘊𝘮 𝘢𝘳𝘊 𝘚𝘊𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘯𝘚 𝘩𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘊𝘳 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘪𝘯𝘥."

We’re seeing the effects every day:

• Bad handoffs
• Insufficient commissioning/point-to-point verification
• Scope drift
• Lack of Oil and Gas operational understanding
• Lack of scope leading to unproductive staff and contractors
• Incomplete commissioning
• Systems that look fine
 until they don’t

If you’re feeling that skills gap in your SCADA project—and not seeing results, SCADATend was built for that exact pressure point.

𝗟𝗲𝘁’𝘀 𝘁𝗮𝗹𝗞. 𝗪𝗲’𝘃𝗲 𝗎𝗌𝘁 𝘆𝗌𝘂r 𝗌𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗶𝗎𝗵𝘁.

𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗮 𝗪𝗲𝗯𝘀𝗶𝘁𝗲 𝗚𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗰𝗵 𝗥𝗲𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗠𝗲 𝗔𝗯𝗌𝘂𝘁 𝗊𝗖𝗔𝗗𝗔 𝗣𝗿𝗌𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁s

Last night, the SCADATend website looked
 bad. Text overlapping. Layout chaos. It was clearly broken.

Because I asked Kimra, who’s excellent with contracts but not websites, to tweak a few things for mobile. And I didn’t check it. On purpose.
I wanted to prove something.
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𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘀 𝗲𝘅𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗹𝘆 𝘄𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗵𝗮𝗜𝗜𝗲𝗻𝘀 𝗌𝗻 𝗊𝗖𝗔𝗗𝗔 𝗜𝗿𝗌𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝘀 𝘄𝗵𝗲𝗻:
• Roles aren’t clearly defined
• Scope isn’t documented
• Deliverables aren’t verified
• And no one’s watching the handoffs
Everyone’s doing their best, but outside their lane, with no system to catch it. And that’s when the mess begins.
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𝗪𝗲 𝘀𝗲𝗲 𝗶𝘁 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗶𝗲𝗹𝗱 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗲:
• Bad handoffs
• Incomplete commissioning
• Undefined or shifting scope
• Lack of operational understanding
• Unproductive time spent solving the wrong problems
• Systems that look fine
 until they don’t
I fixed the website in 10 minutes.
In the field? That same mistake might cost $10,000. Or 10 hours of downtime. Or worse.
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And here’s one more lesson—maybe the most important one:
Kimra changed text on the mobile version, but it broke the desktop version too.

One change, in one place, impacted everything.
That’s how SCADA works. That’s how real systems behave.
And that’s why oversight isn't extra—it's essential.
If you're dealing with complexity like this and don’t have someone watching the structure, you're not just running blind—you're running risky.

We’ve got your oversight.

𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐑𝐞𝐊𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐒𝐂𝐀𝐃𝐀 𝐒𝐲𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐊𝐬 𝐀𝐫𝐞 𝐔𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐂𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐀

Oil fields, saltwater disposal sites, gathering stations, and compressor sites are often miles from the nearest town. That isolation breeds a fatal kind of confidence:

𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥-𝐖𝐚𝐫𝐥𝐝 𝐏𝐫𝐚𝐚𝐟: 𝐋𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐇𝐚𝐜𝐀 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐊𝐩𝐭𝐬, 𝐂𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐥𝐲

One SCADA system was tied directly to the internet — no encryption, no VPN, no segmentation. When I challenged it, they replied: “Nobody’s looking for us.”
Using Wireshark it was noticed at any given moment, 𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐪𝐮𝐞 𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐬 𝐰𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐫𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐚 𝐜𝐚𝐊𝐊𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐒𝐂𝐀𝐃𝐀 𝐬𝐲𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐊— and the vast majority were from overseas. These weren’t casual pings. They were scripted attacks, port scans, brute force login attempts, and protocol-level pokes aimed at known ICS vulnerabilities.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐮𝐭𝐡: 𝐇𝐚𝐜𝐀𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐊𝐧𝐚𝐰 𝐖𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐅𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝𝐬 𝐀𝐫𝐞

Modern threat actors don’t just launch blanket scans — they:

• Know where U.S. energy fields are located
• Understand who the local ISPs are
• Know IP range allocations by provider and region
• Target oil & gas because of the 𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐚 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐞, 𝐮𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐊𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐊𝐞𝐧𝐭, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐥𝐚𝐰
𝐝𝐞𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐞 𝐊𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲

They hit everything, hoping one open port leads to everything else.

𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐊 𝐌𝐢𝐜𝐫𝐚𝐬𝐚𝐟𝐭 365 𝐭𝐚 𝐒𝐂𝐀𝐃𝐀: 𝐇𝐚𝐰 𝐀𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐀𝐬 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐯𝐞𝐥 𝐅𝐮𝐫𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐓𝐡𝐚𝐧 𝐘𝐚𝐮 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐀

The path to compromising your SCADA system might start with something as simple as a Microsoft 365 email or the one MS Office app we all love to use Excel.
Threat actors conduct recon, compromise accounts via phishing or leaked credentials and application vulnerabilities, and then leverage:

• 𝐁𝐫𝐮𝐭𝐞 𝐟𝐚𝐫𝐜𝐞 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐀𝐬
• 𝐎𝐀𝐮𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐚𝐀𝐞𝐧 𝐡𝐢𝐣𝐚𝐜𝐀𝐢𝐧𝐠
• 𝐂𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐩𝐡𝐢𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐠
• 𝐋𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐊𝐚𝐯𝐞𝐊𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐯𝐢𝐚 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐃𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 (Activw Directory has received STIGs)

And here’s the kicker — 𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐲’𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞 𝐚 𝐜𝐚𝐫𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐭, many systems, including SCADA support servers, historian nodes, or even field laptops that sync via OneDrive or SharePoint,𝐛𝐞𝐜𝐚𝐊𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞.

Microsoft has confirmed that since late 2023, attacks on internet-exposed OT systems — including water, wastewater, and energy — have grown rapidly. State-sponsored groups like 𝐂𝐲𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐀𝐯3𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐚-𝐑𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐬 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐬𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐟𝐚𝐫 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐞 𝐬𝐚𝐟𝐭 𝐬𝐩𝐚𝐭𝐬.

𝐅𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝-𝐋𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐌𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐁𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐬 𝐂𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥
What works:

•𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐆𝐬 𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐞𝐝 𝐭𝐚 𝐟𝐢𝐞𝐥𝐝 𝐇𝐌𝐈𝐬, 𝐥𝐚𝐩𝐭𝐚𝐩𝐬, 𝐬𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐜𝐡𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐬
• 𝐍𝐚 𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐧 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐚𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞 — 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐫
• 𝐔𝐬𝐞 𝐚𝐟 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐯𝐚𝐭𝐞 𝐀𝐏𝐍𝐬, 𝐕𝐏𝐍 𝐭𝐮𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐥𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐫𝐲𝐩𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐚𝐥𝐬
• 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐟𝐚𝐫 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐟𝐢𝐠𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐩𝐮𝐬𝐡
• 𝐋𝐚𝐠𝐠𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐛𝐚𝐮𝐧𝐝 𝐟𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐢𝐠𝐧 𝐈𝐏𝐬, 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧 𝐟𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐊𝐩𝐭𝐬

You’re not “too small” or “too remote.” You’re exposed — and the bad guys already know it.

Our country runs on them critical infrasturcture. Our economy relies on it. And our adversaries know it.

𝐌𝐚𝐬𝐭 𝐜𝐚𝐊𝐊𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐞𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐊𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬 𝐬𝐀𝐢𝐩 𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐆𝐬 𝐚𝐥𝐭𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫.
Some barely know what they are.
And the real security? It’s just assumed.

But here’s the uncomfortable truth:

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐀𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐆𝐬 𝐭𝐚𝐚.
They use them to find what you haven’t fixed.
And they don’t care if it breaks your software — they want it broken.

Boards don’t respond to risk charts — they respond to cost.
Would you spend 100 hours hardening a system to avoid a $3M breach?
That’s the conversation every company needs to have.

𝐈𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐠𝐚𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐲, 𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐒𝐓𝐈𝐆 𝐜𝐚𝐊𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐜𝐚𝐧 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐚𝐬𝐞 𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐫𝐚𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐚 𝐜𝐲𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐬, 𝐫𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐲 𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐫𝐮𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐬.Given the sector's reliance on SCADA systems for monitoring and control, failing to implement STIGs can lead to vulnerabilities )

𝐅𝐚𝐫 𝐞𝐱𝐚𝐊𝐩𝐥𝐞, 𝐜𝐲𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐀𝐬 𝐢𝐧 𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐠𝐚𝐬 𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐥𝐲 𝐬𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐝 𝐝𝐮𝐞 𝐭𝐚 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐲'𝐬 𝐫𝐚𝐥𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐞𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐊𝐢𝐜 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲.A lack of standardized security measures, such as STIGs, can result in compliance failures, data breaches, and even operational shutdowns.

𝗊𝗧𝗜𝗚: 𝗜𝘁'𝘀 𝗡𝗌𝘁 𝗝𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗳𝗌𝗿 𝗙𝗲𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗹 𝗡𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗌𝗿𝗞𝘀 𝗔𝗻𝘆𝗺𝗌𝗿𝗲

I’ve talked about STIG-based system hardening and its role in SCADA.
If you’ve been following along, you already know this:
✔ Firewalls and segmentation 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗻𝗌𝘁 𝗲𝗻𝗌𝘂𝗎𝗵
✔ Many attacks 𝗱𝗌𝗻’𝘁 𝗰𝗌𝗺𝗲 𝗳𝗿𝗌𝗺 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗌𝘂𝘁𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲
✔ And no, your remote site is 𝗻𝗌𝘁 𝗶𝗻𝘃𝗶𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲

What STIG brings to the table is 𝗿𝗶𝗎𝗌𝗿—a level of hardening that actually limits software-based exploits, slows lateral movement, and locks down vulnerable paths 𝗯𝗲𝗳𝗌𝗿𝗲 they’re hit.

Most companies don’t implement it because:

1. It takes 𝗲𝘅𝗜𝗲𝗿𝘁𝗶𝘀𝗲
2. It takes 𝗲𝗳𝗳𝗌𝗿𝘁
3 It is 𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗲 𝗰𝗌𝗻𝘀𝘂𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗎.
4. And it’s 𝗻𝗌𝘁 𝗿𝗲𝗟𝘂𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗱—yet

Hardening servers and workstations is more than talking about theory—I mean real-world, boots-on-the-ground examples of what works (and what fails) when it comes to hardening OT infrastructure. Next week, I’ll be shifting focus to 𝗜𝗿𝗌𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗞 𝗺𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗎𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗌𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗌𝗜𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗌𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗎𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁. The kind of practical stuff that makes or breaks SCADA success.

Would you be interested in a 𝘄𝗲𝗯-𝗯𝗮𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗰𝗹𝗮𝘀𝘀 𝗌𝗿 𝗿𝗌𝘂𝗻𝗱𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗰𝘂𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗌𝗻 𝗌𝗻 𝗊𝗧𝗜𝗚 𝗶𝗺𝗜𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗌𝗻 𝗶𝗻 𝗊𝗖𝗔𝗗𝗔 𝗲𝗻𝘃𝗶𝗿𝗌𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀?

𝗜𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁’𝘀 𝘀𝗌𝗺𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗎 𝘆𝗌𝘂'𝗱 𝗳𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝘃𝗮𝗹𝘂𝗲 𝗶𝗻, email me
walter@scadatend.com
I’m exploring how to structure it, and your feedback matters.